Other minds and perceived identity by Gomes, Anil
  
 
OTHER MINDS AND PERCEIVED IDENTITY 
Anil Gomes 
Birkbeck College, London 
 
Forthcoming, Dialectica [accepted 2009] 
 
Quassim Cassam has recently defended a perceptual model of knowledge of 
other minds: one on which we can see and thereby know that another thinks 
and feels. In the course of defending this model, he addresses issues about 
our ability to think about other minds. I argue that his solution to this 
‘conceptual problem’ does not work. A solution to the conceptual problem is 
necessary if we wish to explain knowledge of other minds. 
1. Introduction 
Philosophers have often distinguished two problems of other minds, one 
epistemological and one conceptual. The epistemological problem asks: how 
is it possible to have knowledge of other minds? The conceptual problem 
asks: how is it possible to think about other minds? The relation between 
these questions is unclear, but perhaps it is fair to say that there is a prima 
facie reason for taking the conceptual problem to be more basic. For 
knowledge claims presuppose conceptual capabilities, so any obstacle which 
prevents thought about other minds will, a fortiori, prevent knowledge of 
them. 
In his recent discussion of these issues, Quassim Cassam reverses this order 
of engagement.1 His concern is explaining the possibility of knowledge of 
other minds, and in the course of addressing that ‘how-possible’ question, 
 
1 (Cassam, 2007: ch.5). All references to this work. 
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issues arise regarding our possession of mental concepts. But the primary 
focus is knowledge, and any answer to the conceptual problem takes place in 
this framework. In this paper I will set out Cassam’s solution to both 
problems of other minds, and provide some reason for thinking his response 
to the conceptual problem unconvincing. Further attention must be paid to 
the conceptual problem if we wish to secure knowledge of other minds.  
2. Knowledge of Other Minds 
Cassam addresses the problem of other minds in the course of advocating a 
certain structure for responding to ‘how-possible’ questions in epistemology: 
questions which ask how knowledge of some kind is possible, given supposed 
obstacles to its existence or acquisition. He endorses a ‘multi-levels’ response 
to such questions: first we identify the means by which we come to possess 
the knowledge in question, then we show that there aren’t any obstacles to 
the possibility of gaining knowledge by such means and finally we identify 
the background enabling conditions necessary for this method to serve as a 
means of coming to know. A successful response to a ‘how-possible’ question 
will involve philosophical work at each of these three levels.2 
In the case of other minds, Cassam’s concern is with (HPom): how is 
knowledge of other minds possible? Cassam’s solution is a perceptual model of 
knowledge of other minds, one on which ‘it’s possible to know that others 
think and feel by perceiving that others think and feel’ (p.158). Knowledge of 
other minds is possible because we can sometimes see what another thinks 
and feels, and thereby know that another thinks and feels. Identifying visual 
perception as a source of knowledge of other minds is a first level response to 
the question: it identifies a means by which we can know that others think 
and feel.3 
However, simply identifying perception as a source of knowledge of other 
minds is not sufficient for addressing (HPom), since there are supposed 
obstacles to the possibility of seeing and thereby knowing that someone is 
angry, say. Cassam canvases two such obstacles: that one cannot see that A is 
angry unless one sees his anger, something which cannot be done. And that 
seeing that A is angry requires eliminating the possibility that he is a zombie, 
 
2 See (Cassam 2007: ch.1) 
3 Cassam introduces the perceptual model as one on which a subject can perceive that 
another thinks and feels, clarifying this as the claim that ‘one can sometimes know what 
others are thinking or feeling by visual means’ (2007: p.170, my emphasis). 
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something which also cannot be done. If either of these obstacles is genuine, 
then one cannot see, and thereby know, that another is angry. 
Cassam’s response is to dissipate these obstacles, that is, to deny each of the 
claims. In the case of the first obstacle, that involves arguing that one can see 
that A is angry without seeing his anger. And in the case of the second, it 
involves arguing that seeing that A is angry does not require eliminating the 
zombie possibility. In dissipating both of these obstacles, Cassam draws 
heavily on Dretske’s notion of primary epistemic seeing. In epistemic seeing, 
one sees that something is the case. Primary epistemic seeing is the case 
where we see ‘that b is P by seeing b itself’; the contrast is with those cases of 
secondary epistemic seeing where ‘we see that b is P without seeing b’ (Dreske 
1969: pp.79-80).4 It is the nature of primary epistemic seeing which enables 
Cassam to deny the purported obstacles. 
According to Dretske’s account, primary epistemic seeing is to be 
understood as follows: 
S sees that b is P in a primary epistemic way only if: i. b is P, ii. S seesn b, 
iii. The conditions under which S seesn b are such that b would not look, 
L, the way it now looks to S unless it was P, iv. S, believing the conditions 
are as described in (iii), takes b to be P. (Dretske 1969: taken from pp.79-
88).5 
Applying this to the case of the mental attributes of persons, we have the 
claim that S sees that A is angry only if i. A is angry, ii. S sees A, iii. the 
conditions under which S sees A are such that A would not look, L, the way 
he now looks to S, unless A were angry, and iv. S, believing that the 
conditions are as described in (iii), takes A to be angry. When these 
conditions are met it is possible to see, and thereby know, that another is 
angry. Such is our perceptual knowledge of other minds. 
Cassam’s dissipation of the obstacles countenanced draws upon this notion 
of epistemic seeing. In order to see that A is angry, the four conditions 
outlined above must be met. It isn’t a requirement, therefore, that one see 
A’s anger in order to see that he is angry, in the same way that seeing that the 
metal is hot doesn’t require one to see its heat. The first obstacle can be 
 
4 Cassam’s sole concern is primary epistemic seeing, since it is in primary epistemic seeing 
that one acquires knowledge by perceiving the object in question. See (Dretske 1969: pp.80-
81). 
5 Seesn denotes ‘non-epistemic’ or ‘simple’ seeing.  
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rejected.6 Similarly, eliminating the possibility that A is a zombie would 
involve knowing that the third condition is fulfilled. So if one can’t eliminate 
that possibility, then one can’t know that the third condition pertains. But 
the account of epistemic perception says only that one must believe that the 
third condition is fulfilled, not that one knows that it is so. ‘If I don’t know 
that the third condition is fulfilled then I don’t know that I see that [A] is 
angry, but I nevertheless see that he is angry.’ (p.168). The zombie-
elimination requirement is not a genuine requirement on epistemic 
perception, thus the second obstacle can be rejected.7 
One might question either of these moves, but for the purposes of this paper, 
all I want to note is the extent to which Cassam’s dissipation of the supposed 
obstacles to his perceptual model draws heavily on the notion of epistemic 
perception. This is important because so far we have only addressed the 
supposed obstacles to a perceptual response to (HPom). In order to complete 
the response and secure knowledge of other minds, we must identify the 
necessary background conditions under which it is possible for epistemic 
perception to serve as a source of knowledge of other minds. These enabling 
conditions explain what makes it possible for epistemic perception to serve as 
a source of the knowledge in question, and thus complete our response to 
(HPom). 
What are the enabling conditions for epistemic perception? We can identify 
one by noting that seeing that someone is angry requires possession of the 
concept of anger. Moreover, it requires that your possession of the concept of 
anger is such that you can think of it as being potentially applicable both to 
yourself and to others. In order to think of anger in this way, one must grasp 
a sameness or identity condition: you must be able to think of another’s state 
of anger as being of the same type as your own. So one enabling condition 
on seeing that someone is angry is a grasp of this sameness relation. Cassam 
terms this the Identity Condition. ‘What the identity condition says is that it 
wouldn’t be possible for me to see that [A] is angry unless I can think of the 
state that he is in when he is angry as a state of the very same type as I am in 
when I am angry.’ (p.172). Grasp of this sameness condition is necessary for 
 
6 (Cassam 2007: pp.162-5). Cassam suggests that there is a sense in which you see his anger, 
since you see A venting, or manifesting, his anger. But this is only seeing his anger ‘in a 
sense’ (p.164). 
7 (Cassam 2007: pp.165-171). Since seeing that p is a way of knowing that p, it follows that 
if you don’t know that the third condition is fulfilled, you don’t know that you know that A 
is angry. 
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possession of the concept of anger, and therefore necessary for someone to 
perceive that another is angry. 
We have identified one enabling condition on the possibility of epistemic 
perception serving as a source of knowledge of other minds. But an 
immediate question arises, namely, how is it possible to grasp this sameness 
condition? As Cassam puts it, ‘how is it possible for me to understand that I 
am ascribing states of the same type in the two cases? How is grasp of this 
sameness relation possible?’ (p.179). Consideration of the enabling 
conditions of epistemic perception leads us directly to this question: a 
question which brings in issues about our ability to think of another mind. 
The conceptual problem of other minds enters at the third level of Cassam’s 
‘multi-levels’ approach. 
One reason people have been tempted to ask the question ‘how is it possible 
to think about other minds?’ is because they have seen a problem with 
accounting for our grasp of mental concepts, where mental concepts are 
understood to apply both to others and to ourselves. This is the question 
that arises for Cassam: how is it possible to grasp such an understanding of 
the mental? The question has force given a prima facie obstacle to our 
attaining such an understanding, namely that our ascription of mental 
concepts to others proceeds on the basis of different grounds to our 
ascription of mental concepts to ourselves. Given this difference in 
ascription-conditions, what gives us ground for thinking that our 
applications of mental concepts are univocal? 
One immediate way to dissipate this obstacle is to deny that self and other-
ascriptions proceed in a different manner; to claim instead that I ascribe 
anger to myself on the same basis that I ascribe it to others. Ryle endorses 
such a claim, arguing that the differences between the ways in which we find 
out about our own minds and the ways we find out about others are 
‘differences of degree, not of kind’ (Ryle 1949: p.179). The knowledge we 
have of our own mind stems not from any privileged access, but from the 
more mundane fact that we are often better placed than others to observe the 
same corpus of evidence. And, as Ryle suggests, once one denies that the way 
we find out about our own minds is fundamentally different from the way 
we find out about others, the conceptual problem dissolves, for ‘no 
metaphysical Iron Curtain exists compelling us to be absolute strangers to 
one another.’ (p.181). 
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But this dissipation seems too extreme, denying as it does that there is 
anything distinctive about our first-person application of mental concepts.8 
Certainly there are occasions on which the way I find out about my own 
mind is comparable to the way I find out about others, as when I come to 
realise that I am angry with my friend by noticing my clenched fists and 
clipped sentences. But this seems to be the exception rather than the norm. 
In general we take it not only that we know our own minds better than other 
people’s, but that we know about them in a different way, one which 
explains the default authority we have with regards to our own self-
ascriptions. And as long as one thinks that there is a distinctive way in which 
we self-ascribe mental predicates, then the conceptual problem can be raised: 
how is it that we understand our ascriptions of such concepts to be univocal 
given the different grounds for assertion? 
This problem arises for any account of the self-ascription of mental concepts 
which falls short of Ryle’s claim that there is no difference between the ways 
in which we find out about our own minds and the ways in which we find 
out about others. For rejecting Ryle’s claim amounts to an insistence that 
there is something distinctive about the way in which we find out about our 
own mental life. And that leaves open Cassam’s question of how it is possible 
for us to grasp the Identity Condition given the fundamentally different 
grounds for assertion in each case. Note that this applies equally to those 
perceptual models of self-knowledge that want to hold onto something 
distinctively first-personal about introspection. For although such models 
introduce introspection by analogy with perception, nevertheless there is 
often claimed to be an essentially first-personal indexical element to 
introspective representations, an element which explains the fact that 
introspection is a distinctive way of gaining self-knowledge. And as long as 
self and other ascriptions of mental predicates proceed on fundamentally 
different grounds, then the question retains its force.9 
This, then, is how the conceptual problem of other minds enters the 
dialectic. In order to explain how we can see that another is angry, we have 
to address the question of how it is possible to grasp the concept of anger, 
given the difference in assertibility-conditions. Cassam’s solution is to 
overcome the obstacle, that is, to show that there is a way we can come to 
 
8 Cassam (p.179) concurs. 
9 See (Gertler 2009) and (Shoemaker 1994) for discussion and criticism of perceptual 
models of introspection, and (Wright et.al. 1998) for discussions of self-knowledge more 
generally. Thanks to a reviewer for raising the issue of self-knowledge. 
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grasp the sameness condition. Suppose, Cassam says, that I can see that A is 
angry, and I become angry at the way he is being treated. What do I see? ‘I 
see that he is angry but that is not all. I also see that he is just as angry as I 
am. In other words, I see that the state he is in is no different from the state I 
am in… In such cases, the identity of mental state is a presented or perceived 
identity, and this is what makes it possible for me to think of [A]’s state and 
mine as states of the same type.’ (p.181). 
Here we have a solution to the conceptual problem of other minds. In 
certain situations, it is possible to see that A is in the same type of mental 
state that I am in. This perceived identity suffices for me to grasp the 
sameness condition and thereby understand that our states are states of the 
same type. It is therefore possible to grasp the sameness condition, and thus 
there is no obstacle to grasping the concept of anger. We have a multi-levels 
response to (HPom) and the perceptual model solution to the possibility of 
knowledge of other minds can stand. 
3. Perceived Identity 
I do not believe that Cassam’s solution to the conceptual problem works. 
But let me make one thing explicit: Cassam does not claim that the 
perceived identity of mental states is necessary for us to grasp mental 
concepts. It may well be that there are other ways to grasp the sameness 
relation. All he is concerned to show is that it is possible for us to do so, and 
demonstrating the possibility of grasping such a sameness relation is 
sufficient for overcoming the supposed obstacle and validating the possibility 
of epistemic perception providing us with knowledge of another’s mind.10 
To dispute Cassam’s solution, then, one has to show that it is not possible to 
see that A is in the same mental state that I am in. ‘Same mental state’ here 
means ‘same type of mental state’, a phrase which picks out a relation 
holding between two persons. What is necessary for me to see that A stands 
 
10 Although Cassam stresses that perception need only be a means of coming to grasp the 
sameness relation, he does not mention any other routes. If one thinks that there are many 
cases in which subjects grasp the concept of anger without having perceived that another is 
angry whilst being angry themselves, then Cassam’s perceived identity solution will seem a 
touch peripheral. 
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in this relation to me? Thinking about the conditions necessary to see that 
this relation holds can highlight some problems for Cassam’s account.11 
 
Perceived Identity and Seeing Oneself 
Cassam does not provide any account of what is involved in relational 
epistemic seeing – seeing that a certain relation holds – but given that he 
draws explicitly on Dretske’s account of epistemic seeing in his discussion of 
other minds, it is natural to turn to Dretske to elucidate relational epistemic 
seeing. According to Dretske, relational epistemic seeing should be 
understood on the model of primary epistemic perception discussed above, 
with the amendment that S sees that A bears R to B only if she sees both A 
and B.12 Seeing the items related is a condition of seeing that the relation 
holds. 
There is some intuitive support for this claim. Consider a case in which one 
sees that the bookcase is taller than the door. It is natural to think that it is a 
requirement on someone being in this state that she sees both the bookcase 
and the door. In particular, it will be a requirement that one sees both the 
bookcase and the door if you think that, in virtue of seeing that the bookcase 
is taller than the door a subject also sees that the door is such that the 
bookcase is taller than it.13 For seeing that A is some way requires one to see 
A; so seeing that B is such that A bears R to it will require one to see B. If 
seeing that A bears R to B entails seeing that B is such that A bears R to it, 
then it will follow that one can see that A bears R to B only if one sees both 
A and B. 
Applying this to Cassam’s case of perceived identity has it that I see that A is 
in the same type of mental state as me only if I can see both A and myself. 
The first conjunct is unproblematic: it is a condition on seeing that A is 
 
11 To reiterate the point made in n.3, Cassam is concerned to defend the claim that one ‘can 
sometimes know what others are thinking or feeling by visual means’ (2007: p.170, my 
emphasis.) Challenging Cassam’s solution involves showing that we cannot visually perceive 
that A is in the same mental state as me. 
12 (Dretske 1969: pp.140-1). The third condition is correspondingly amended to hold that 
both A and B would not look the way they do relative to one another unless A bore R to C. 
13 This is an application of what Richard Price terms the reversibility constraint: 
‘Necessarily, if A is represented as bearing R to B, then B is represented as being such that 
A bears R to it’. For defence and application, see (Price 2005). 
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angry that I can see A. But what about the condition that I see myself? Is this 
claim plausible? For it to be true that I am myself an object of primary 
epistemic seeing, I have to see myself as a possible subject of mental 
predicates – ‘qua subject’ as Cassam puts it – and not simply see ‘my body’.14 
If I cannot see myself as a subject, then I cannot see that I am such that A 
bears the relation of being in the same type of mental state to me – and, by 
implication above, cannot see that A bears the relation of being in the same 
type of mental state to me. 
Do I see myself as a subject? Hume famously denied that the self could ever 
be an object of experience.15 But even those who have taken issue with 
Hume have not gone so far as to claim that we can see ourselves as subjects. 
Cassam has argued elsewhere that we are intuitively aware and presented to 
ourselves, qua subjects, as objects in the world, but this intuitive awareness of 
ourselves as subjects is not based on visual perception.16 To make good the 
claim that I can be an object of epistemic perception, it is not enough that I 
am aware of myself as a subject in the world, I have to be able to see myself as 
a subject. And visual perception simply doesn’t present the subject in this 
way. 
Consider again the initial puzzlement that generated the conceptual 
problem. Our question was about how a subject could understand that her 
self-ascriptions of anger were applications of the same concept that she 
applies to others, given the different ground for ascriptions. Essential to this 
way of stating the problem is the thought that self-ascriptions of anger 
proceed on a different basis to other-ascriptions. So it is no help to Cassam 
to note that I can see myself in a mirror, since when I see that I am angry in 
a mirror, my application of the concept to myself proceeds on the basis of 
observation. The perceived identity solution was meant to explain how I can 
understand that non-observational self-ascriptions of the concept are 
applications of the same concept applied to others, and that requires that 
vision present me as a subject of experience in this sense. But visual 
experience plays no role in these self-ascriptions of mental properties.17 
 
14 Cf. Cassam: ‘seeing that the Bursar is angry by seeing what his body looks like wouldn’t 
qualify as primary epistemic seeing since strictly speaking it wouldn’t be a case in which I see 
that the Bursar is angry by seeing him’ (p.174). 
15 (Hume 1978: p.252) 
16 (Cassam 1999) 
17 My thanks to a reviewer for raising the issue of seeing oneself in a mirror. 
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Cassam’s perceived identity solution to the conceptual problem requires that 
one be able to see that A is in the same mental state as me. And if it is right 
that relational epistemic seeing requires one to see both of the objects related, 
then there is reason to doubt the adequacy of this proposal – for it requires 
that I see myself as a subject of experience to whom anger can be self-
ascribed. But visual experience does not present oneself as a subject in this 
way. So I cannot see that A stands in the relation of being in the same 
mental state to me. 
  
Perceived Identity and How Things Look 
Perhaps then Cassam could reject the thought that seeing that A bears R to B 
requires one to see both A and B. We can think of cases in which one sees 
that the bookcase is taller than one’s niece, without the implication that one 
also sees her at that moment. Or seeing that the runner is ahead of his 
opponent, where one sees him alone coming round the final bend. If these 
are genuine cases of epistemic seeing, then one can see that A bears R to B 
without seeing that B is such that A bears R to it.18 
For Dretske, such cases count as cases of secondary relational epistemic 
seeing: cases in which one sees that A bears R to B without seeing both of the 
relata. The term ‘secondary’ is not meant to derogate this type of epistemic 
perception: in such cases one still sees that something is the case. Rather it is 
termed secondary because it presupposes or embodies a primary epistemic 
achievement: one can only see that A bears R to B in a secondary sense if one 
can see (primarily) that something is the case. It is by seeing (primarily) that 
A has a particular property that one can see that the relation holds. But this 
secondary epistemic perception is still a kind of epistemic perception, so there 
is no reason to bar Cassam the use of secondary relational epistemic seeing in 
explaining his account of perceived identity. 
What are the conditions necessary for something to count as an instance of 
secondary relational epistemic seeing? Dretske summarises the conditions as 
follows: 
 
18 This section has greatly benefited from the comments of two anonymous reviewers. 
  11 
S sees that b1 is R to b2 in a secondary epistemic way iff i. b1 is R to b2, ii. 
S sees b1 and sees (primarily) that b1 is Q… iii. Conditions are such that 
b1 would not be Q unless b1 was R to b2… iv. S, believing conditions to 
be as described in (iii.), takes b1 to be R to b2. (Dretske 1969: taken from 
page 154.) 19 
That is, in order for someone to see that A bears R to B by only seeing one of 
the items related, she must see that A has a particular property (Q), such that 
she can see (primarily) that A is Q, and A would not be Q unless it bore R to 
B. 
Primary epistemic seeing is thus built into the account of secondary 
relational epistemic seeing: the subject must be able to see (primarily) that A 
is Q in order to be able to see (secondarily) that A bears R to B. And 
according to the conditions set out for something to count as a case of 
primary epistemic perception, seeing that A is Q requires that conditions be 
such that A would not look the way it now looks to the perceiver unless it 
was Q.20 It is because A has a look which it would not have were it not Q, 
that the subject is able to see that A bears R to B. 
Does the case of perceiving that A is in the same mental state as me meet 
these conditions? It will be instructive to begin with a simpler case of 
primary relational epistemic seeing, and work towards the more complicated 
secondary cases. Consider a case in which one sees two red lights, and sees 
that they are the same colour as each other. How does this fare as a case of 
primary epistemic seeing? One sees both relata, and they do bear the relation 
of being the same colour, so the initial two conditions are satisfied. Of 
interest, though, is the third condition: that conditions be such that both A 
and B would not look the way they do relative to one another unless A bore 
R to B.21 Does the third condition hold for this case? It does, for were A to 
lose the relation of bearing R to B, A and B would not look the way they do 
relative to one another. So one can see that the lights are of the same colour. 
When both the related items are seen, then, the relation contributes towards 
the way the objects look, and one can see that the relation holds. What about 
cases of secondary relational epistemic seeing, where one sees only one of the 
 
19 I have simplified conditions ii.) and iii.) slightly to focus on those cases where one sees 
only one of the items related. 
20 See the conditions enumerated in the quote from Dretske in §2 above. 
21 This is an amended version of the third condition for non-relational seeing cited in the 
initial quote from Dretske above. 
  12 
items related? We can begin by considering those cases in which it seems 
intuitively appropriate to say that one sees that a relation holds despite only 
seeing one of the items related. Take the case of seeing that the runner is 
ahead of his opponent.22 Does this count as a case of secondary relational 
epistemic perception? In order to so count, I must see (primarily) that the 
runner has a certain property which he would not have were he not ahead of 
his opponent. Arguably he does possess such a property, namely the property 
of being alone on this stretch of the track. And he would not look the way he 
does unless he possessed this property. So I can see that he possesses this 
property, and thereby count as seeing that he is ahead of his opponent. 
In this case, the relation itself doesn’t contribute directly to the way things 
look, since one does not see both of the items related. But it contributes 
indirectly to the look of the scene, through the presence of property Q – a 
property which the object would lack were the relation not to hold, and 
which contributes towards the way the object looks. A similar case can be 
made for other such intuitively acceptable cases, such as seeing that the 
bookcase is taller than one’s niece and so on. In these cases, the object seen 
has a particular appearance which it would not have if it did not bear the 
relation to the unseen object. 
How does this bear on the case of seeing that A is in the same mental state as 
me? In order for me to be able to see that this relation holds when only 
seeing A, A must possesses some property Q which he would not possess 
were he not in the same mental state as me, and conditions must be such 
that A would not look the way he looks to me now unless he possessed Q. 
That is, there must be a way A looks such that he would not possess that 
look were he not in the same mental state as me. If this claim is true, and if I 
believe it to be true, then I can see that A is in the same mental state as me. 
Is there any plausibility to this claim? There seems no reason to suppose that 
being in the same mental state as me affects the way that A looks, or, to put 
it more carefully, that there is a property which contributes towards the way 
A looks which he would not possess were he not in the same mental state as 
me. What property could that be? The reason that we are inclined to say that 
we can see that the runner is ahead of his opponent, or that the bookcase is 
taller than my niece, is because the items perceived have a certain look which 
they would lack if the relation did not hold – whether that be the loneliness 
 
22 The example is Dretske’s: (1969: p.142). 
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of the runner or the perceptible height of the bookcase. But in the case of 
perceiving someone who is in the same mental state as me, there isn’t a 
particular look he has which he would lack were we not to be in the same 
mental state.23 
Consider the two red lights, but suppose now that one of them is in the 
other room. Can I see that the lights are the same colour? It seems not, 
because conditions are not such that the observed light has a look which it 
would not have were the two not of the same colour. Or amend one of the 
cases of secondary relational epistemic seeing already discussed. Let’s say that 
my absent niece is prone both to growth spurts and sudden shortenings, such 
that her height at any particular time is essentially random. Nevertheless she 
is, at this moment, shorter than the bookcase. Can I see that the bookcase is 
taller than my niece? Dretske’s conditions give us a nice explanation of why I 
cannot. The bookcase is taller than my niece, and it has some property Q 
regarding its height such that I can see (primarily) that the bookcase is Q. 
Nevertheless, the third condition is not met: conditions are not such that the 
bookcase would not be Q unless it was taller than my niece, and thus I 
cannot see that it is taller than my niece. 
The relation of being in the same mental state is like the relation of being the 
same colour in the case of the lights in different rooms. When one cannot 
see both of the items related, one cannot see that the relation holds – for 
there is no property which is both such that the object has a look which it 
would not have were it to lack the property and is also such that the object 
would not possess that property were the relation not to hold. To put it 
more simply, in order for me to see that a relation holds, that relation has to 
contribute towards the look of the objects seen. The relation of being in the 
same mental state does not do this. The third condition for epistemic seeing 
is not met: I cannot see that A is in the same type of mental state as me. 
Regardless, then, of whether seeing that A is in the same mental state as me 
requires me to see both A and myself, the conditions for relational epistemic 
seeing are not met by the case where A is in the same mental state as me. 
Primary relational epistemic seeing requires that I see both of the items 
related, but I do not see myself as a subject. Secondary relational epistemic 
seeing requires that the relation contributes towards the look of the object 
 
23 There’s a related problem here which is that, in contrast to other cases of secondary 
epistemic seeing, the item which is not seen – namely myself, qua subject – has not been 
previously seen. 
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seen, but the relation of being in the same mental state does not do this. It is 
not possible to see that A is in the same mental state as me, so Cassam’s 
claim regarding the perceived identity of mental states should be rejected. 
That leaves open the question of how it is possible to grasp a concept of 
anger which applies both to others and ourselves, given the difference in 
applicability-conditions, a question which must be addressed if we are to 
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